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ABSTRACT
Weighing principles and considering rules in the context of
judicial adjudication to create a general theory of State and Law is a
challenge of hermeneutics that the Author makes. To meet this
challenge the Author uses a decision of an administrative court in
Portugal – the Tribunal Administrativo Central Norte. The factpattern of that decision involved a foreign citizen living illegally in
the country. While illegally residing in the country, that citizen was
a victim of a crime of bodily harm. She complained to the police. The
police asked her for her passport to proceed with the claim. They
realized she was Brazilian and that she was residing illegally in the
country. Consequently, rather than proceeding with the complaint,
the police activated the process of expulsion of the foreign citizen
from the country for she was an illegal resident. A judge confirmed
the order of expulsion. That foreign citizen filed an action for an
injunction to stop the order of expulsion from being enforced. In this
context, must or must not a judge within the trial of an action for an
injunction confirm the decision of expulsion of a foreign citizen who
is illegally in the country, but who was a victim of a crime of bodily
harm? This case resonates with many other reported cases all over
the world involving illegal immigrants, their children, and their
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1007

1008

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

families who face harsh judgments. For the judge, the challenge
inherent in these cases is to balance fundamental rights in light of
constitutional principles to avoid disproportionate solutions.
Principles are measured up and scaled down; but ultimately, every
citizen, illegally staying in a country or not, is lifted by their human
dignity and that cannot be disregarded.
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Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. [ . . . ]
Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are
taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject
to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.
John Rawls1

1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1999).
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
A judgment of an administrative court in Portugal—Tribunal
Administrativo Central Norte 2 —dismissed the appeal from the
decision of an Administrative and Tax Court—Tribunal
Administrativo e Fiscal de Penafiel—filed by a Brazilian citizen. The
appealed decision had dismissed the action for an injunction filed
by that Brazilian citizen. The action for an injunction was meant to
suspend the administrative act ordered by the General Director of
the Portuguese Immigration and Border Services, determining the
expulsion of that Brazilian citizen from Portugal. This citizen was
an illegal immigrant in the Portuguese territory. While she was
illegally staying in the country, she was a victim of a crime of bodily
harm. Notwithstanding the analysis of the arguments used by the
court throughout the judgment,3 the central question of this Article
is the following. In the event that a foreign citizen who illegally
resides in the country is a victim of a crime of bodily harm and for
that reason files a complaint with the police, should or should not
a court, within an action for an injunction (and in an appeal against
the lower court’s decision) uphold the administrative decision to
expel that illegal immigrant from the country? This scenario
unfolds a conflict between the constitutional principle of equality
between foreign citizens and Portuguese citizens and the principle
of legality, inherent to administrative law. This case raises other
fundamental questions. What does a principle mean? Is the conflict
between the principles of legality and equality admissible in the
realm of administrative law?4 In other words, does this case raise
2. Opinion of the Administrative Court Central North No 00490/06.8BEPNF (2007)
(Portugal),
IGFEJ
(Feb.
2,
2019),
available
at
http://www.dgsi.pt/jtcn.nsf/89d1c0288c2dd49c802575c8003279c7/eb01fe0c46f3955
68025725a005d4381?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,00490%2F06.8BEPNF%20
[https://perma.cc/7HJP-ZYKH].
3. The Author examined this judgment for the first time for an investigative project
about the theory of argumentation hosted by the Research Center on Law and Society of
the Faculty of Law of the Nova University of Lisbon (“CEDIS”) back in 2009. After more
than a decade, the problems raised by the court decision in respect to immigration still
resonate. For a reference to the investigative work developed by CEDIS, see the following
link: https://cedis.fd.unl.pt/ [https://perma.cc/4Y3H-SXXD] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
4. The principle of legality (or the rule of law) is a core principle of administrative
proceedings in most Member States of the European Union. This principle also is a
fundamental principle of European Administrative Law, which, for the most part,
reverberates the way French law conceives the principle of legality. For a definition of the
principle of legality, see Ján Klucka, The General Trends of EU Administrative Law, 41 INT’L
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a problem of legal and constitutional interpretation, or is it just a
matter of principle in the sense that the acceptance of a common
political morality can lead us?
The Portuguese legal system allows the primacy of the
principle of legality over the principle of equality even in situations
when that prevalence may violate the individual’s rights, freedoms,
and guarantees. To understand if the prevalence of the principle of
legality is justified under the circumstances, the Author follows in
the footsteps of Robert Alexy and starts from the premise that
principles are commands of optimization. To this end, she lists the
following ancillary questions to which she provides an answer
throughout the text:
1.

What are the interests that the applicable rules protect?

2. What is the relationship that exists or should exist
between principles and rules, especially when administrative
authorities subordinate the right to physical integrity to the
principle of legality, and that fact, in and of itself, advocates an
attack to the principles of equity and justice as the sole end of
the democratic State and any other dimension of morality?
3. How can a court decision on the merits of an action for an
injunction only be based on black letter law when there is a
conflict between the principles of legality and equality that
undermines the individual’s fundamental right to physical
protection?
4.

Is judicial activism a solution to the problem?

5. If judicial activism is a solution to the problem, is it a
reflection or reverberation of a current crisis of legal
positivism and utilitarian perceptions of the Law?5
L. 1047, 1048 (2007) (saying that the principle of legality determines that administrative
authorities act exclusively within limits set up by the law. Furthermore, the Author states
that “The judicially reviewable principles that limit the autonomy of the administration are
thus essential guarantees for the respect of the rule of law”). The question in the text
regarding the apparent opposition between the principles of legality and equality aims at
exposing that administrative law serves as a playing field for the interaction between
concordia discordantium principiae.
5. The Author could ask other questions. For example: what is the role of the civil law
judge in the application and interpretation of the law? Does the civil law judge have an
active role in creating the law? If not, should the civil law judge claim it? To what extent
can judges in the civil law tradition, by assuming a dynamic role within the sources of law,
decide outside the parameters of the State law? Do civil law judges act ex officio - and,
therefore, are limited by the normative production of the State - or, using the rationality of
their arguments, will civil law judges have such legitimacy to construe legal arguments that

2020]

BALANCING PRINCIPLES

1011

The Author analyzes how the judge’s decision could have been
different had they adequately weighed or ranked the principles
and rules of law contained in the legal provisions applicable to the
case. The Author analyzes this within the rationality and legal
argumentation of Robert Alexy, and the ideas of morality, integrity,
and material justice present in Ronald Dworkin’s discourse.
Besides, more than the analysis of the suitability of the norms, the
analysis of the facts should be the object of a post-positivist
hermeneutic attitude. There is an implicit context here dominated
by xenophobic, sexist, moralistic values—the plaintiff is a Brazilian
woman, and therefore, presumably a prostitute, a subhuman
category that can be beaten up and that the judge did not scumble
for purposes of appraising the merit of the plaintiff’s pleadings.
II. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN CONTEXT
A.

Robert Alexy: from practical discourse to legal discourse

Alexy, unlike authors like MacCormick,6 starts from a theory
of general practical argumentation to build the structure of the
legal discourse and argumentation. Thus, legal discourse is
considered by Alexy as a special case of general practical discourse
or moral discourse. 7 The classification of legal discourse as a
go beyond the frontiers of positive law? However, these are prior theoretical problems.
Moreover: considering the problem under analysis in the text, responding to these
questions may be even a useless endeavor. Here, the judge does not seem to be creating
the law. Instead, they are ranking the rules, for which it is enough to resort to hermeneutics
or constitutional interpretative arguments.
6 . The analysis of other modern theories of argumentation such as those of
Wittgenstein, Austin, Hare, Toulmin, Stevenson, or Baier is equally compelling. These
authors have greatly influenced Alexy’s scholarship. However, Alexy’s theory of
argumentation places him closer to legal interpretivism alongside authors like Dworkin.
See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE
AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 1989) 1978
[hereinafter ALEXY ARGUMENTATION].
7. See id. at 14-15. Providing that legal reasoning is,
[. . .] a linguistic activity which occurs in many different situations from
courtroom to classroom. This linguistic activity is concerned, in a sense yet to be
more precisely defined, with the correctness of normative statements. It will be
expedient to designate such activity ‘discourse’ and, further, since it concerns
the correctness of normative statements, as ‘practical discourse.’ Legal discourse
is a special case of general practical discourse.
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special case of general practical discourse is crucial to understand
that both types of discourse are concerned with the correctness of
normative statements. Legal discourse is a special case because it
is limited by its own sources such as statutory law, precedents,
procedure, and doctrine. A legal statement that is correct means
that it is rationally justifiable despite the limitations of the legal
discourse. 8 By adopting an “normative-analytical” approach, 9
Alexy developed a theory of original legal argumentation. Alexy’s
doctrine, which is of Kantian origin and Habermasian inspiration,10
intends to create a normative theory of legal argumentation that
allows to disentangle the good from the bad arguments, 11 and
allows the analysis of the logical structure of the arguments,
through the incorporation of empirical elements.12

But see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 233 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) stating that,
[. . .] one should not conceive legal discourse as a special case of moral discourses
[. . .]. The procedural principles tested and confirmed in practice and the maxims
of interpretation canonized in textbooks on legal method will be satisfactorily
captured in a discourse theory only when the network of argumentation,
bargaining, and political communications in which the legislative process occurs
has been more thoroughly analyzed than it has been to date.
Later on, Habermas points out that, “Although the special case thesis, in one version
or another, is plausible from a heuristic standpoint, it suggests that law is subordinate
to morality. This subordination is misleading, because it is still burdened by naturallaw connotations.”
8. ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 16.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 114 (maintaining that “[t]he decisive step for Habermas consists in his claim
that the ‘naturally evolved and internally regulated’ language-system on which every
argumentation rests in the first instance must, in turn, itself be the subject of
argumentation”).
11. Id. at 178 providing that,
To be sure, mere reference to the fact that normative statements are amenable
to discussion is as yet no conclusive reason for speaking of their amenability to
justification on their correctness. Such discussions might be no more than
contrivances for persuading, for exerting psychological influence. The crucial
question is whether there are criteria or rules for distinguishing good from bad
reasons, valid from invalid arguments.
12. Id. at 28-29.
These analytical investigations would have to be supplemented by empirical
studies of legal decision-making behaviour. It might be seen as a defect in the
current work that these things are not attempted here. It is, however, not
possible for everything to happen at once. It would be enough if the
investigations presented here could make a contribution to the foundation of a
theory of rational legal argumentation—a theory which, it is to be hoped, will
one day be so firmly grounded and so widely developed that it will not only
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For Alexy and Habermas, the theory of argumentation is a
theory of procedure. 13 The procedure, that is, the relevant
decision-making process, may or may not include the possibility of
modifying the individuals’ normative and factual beliefs as well as
their interests from what those normative and factual beliefs and
interests looked like at the beginning of the procedure. This theory
of procedure offers a solution to the so-called “Münchhausen
Trilemma.” 14 The procedure Alexy proposes consists of a set of
semantic and practical rules to avoid what according to Alexy
would be a real dilemma. Such a dilemma boils down to the
following fact. The continuous justification of normative
statements may either lead us to a situation of infinite regress, or
to a rule that is psychologically and sociologically grounded but
unamenable to argumentation. 15 Those semantic and practical
rules that Alexy proposes aim to transform the practical discourse
into a rational one. 16 However, because the rules of practical
discourse do not guarantee a solution to an ethical-moral dilemma
clarify the character of legal science as a normative discipline but will also
provide practical guidelines for the practicing lawyer.
Alexy recognizes that “…almost all legal—just as almost all general practical—argument
forms include empirical elements.” Id. at 232.
13. JÜRGEN HABERMAS supra note 7, at 237 maintaining that “[t]he legal discourse of
the court [. . .] is played out in a procedural-legal vacuum, so that reaching a judgement is
left up to the judge’s professional ability: “With respect to the effect of the reception of the
evidence, the court decides according to its free conviction obtained from the entire trial.”
The aim is to preserve legal discourse from external influences by moving it outside the
actual procedure.” On the other hand, Dworkin rejects the proposition that, in order to
demonstrate the rights the parties are entitled to under a hard case, it is necessary to resort
to a procedure. The argument that “no proposition can be true unless it can, at least in
principle, be demonstrated to be true” does not include, in particular, the application of
claims about rights. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (2009).
14. HANS ALBERT, TRATADO DA RAZÃO CRÍTICA [TREATISE OF CRITICAL REASONING] 26-28
(J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) trans., 1976) (1968).
15. See ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 179. See also KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 93-94 (1968).
16. See ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 179.
This ‘Münchhausen Trilemma’ (as H. Albert calls it) is, however, not without
remedy. It can be avoided by dropping the demand for ever further justification
of every statement by another statement, in favour of a set of requirements
governing the procedure of justification. These requirements can be formulated
as rules of rational discussion. The rules of rational discussion do not relate only
to statements as do the rules of logic, but reach out beyond them to govern the
conduct of the speaker. To this extent they can be called ‘pragmatic rules.’
Observance of these rules does certainly not guarantee the conclusive certainty
of all results, but it does nevertheless mark the results out as rational ones.
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legal procedure is a way of filling the rationality gaps of the
practical discourse. Considering the illustration of the problem –
the claim of the Brazilian citizen who was a victim of a crime of
bodily harm while illegally residing in Portugal —the Author is
interested in the justification of the Law, from a discursive point of
view, based on its normative dimension.
B. Legal Discourse and Argumentation as Means of Rationality. The
Creation of a General Theory of State and Law
In the legal discourse, similarly to the moral discourse, there
is a claim for correction, and the rules of the general practical
discourse described above are also applied. However, in this
context, rather than demonstrating the level of rationality of a
premise, by using the legal discourse the interpreter seeks to
demonstrate that they can rationally ground a proposition within
the framework of the current legal order. Consequently, the legal
discourse has its own rules that impose subjection to the law, to
propositions, and legal dogma.17
However, Alexy understands that due to the influence of the
frailty of the practical discourse in the legal discourse, the
application of the legal rules inevitably does not result in one sole
correct solution. 18 We are, in effect, in the dimension of the
discursively possible. 19 As in practical or moral argumentation,
also in legal argumentation, discourse participants can rationally
discuss normative conceptions and implicit values, modify or
correct such conceptions or eliminate the shortcomings evident in
the legal system.
The practical value of a theory of legal argumentation can only
be revealed in the context of a general theory of State and Law, that
is capable of uniting the model of the legal system as a system of
procedures to the model of the legal system as a system of norms.
17. On the justification of a normative premise or legal decision through internal and
external justification, see id. at 221-95.
18. Dworkin goes in the opposite direction, calling those who consider that there are
no correct answers in the realm of morality or interpretation skeptics. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 76-86 (1998); DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 82 (saying “[s]o there is
no important difference in philosophical category or standing between the statement that
slavery is wrong and the statement that there is a right answer to the question of slavery,
namely that it is wrong”).
19. ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 135-36.
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The judge that decided the case of the Brazilian citizen was not
democratically elected. The case challenges the constitutional
principle of equality. The judgment of the court needs justification.
Democracies are subject to the rule of majority. However, courts
lack that democratic legitimacy. So why should court decisions
take precedence over constitutional principles that are reflection
of human rights and have been accepted by the People of that
state? The lack of democratic legitimacy of the courts raises the
issue of institutional control of the controlling institution—the
court. Alexy created a system that allows the interpreter to weigh
constitutional principles. The interpreter’s activity is constrained
by rules of procedure, which means that interpretation also is an
exercise of state authority. Again, all state authority stems from the
will of the People. However, one must resist to only attributing a
decisionistic effect to democracy for it follows the rule of majority.
Argumentation complements the rules of procedure which courts
abide by. Thus, the courts’ agency is decisionistic and
argumentative at the same time. Besides the procedural rules, their
decisions must be grounded in good arguments that are just,
normatively ideal, correct or rationally justifiable. A general theory
of State and Law intends to show that the practice of law is not
foreign to the fact that the normative system also contains
fundamental rights or principles.20
III. BALANCING PRINCIPLES AND THE RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADJUDICATION
A. The “Weight Formula” and the prevailing principle
There are several criteria set forth to distinguish rules from
principles. 21 Alexy defines principles as “optimization
requirements,” because “they can be satisfied to varying degrees,
and […] the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on
what is factually possible but also on what is legally possible.”22 In
turn, he defines rules as “norms which are always either fulfilled or
20. See Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 572 (2005); Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Democracy, and Representation,
3 RICHERCHE GIURIDICHE [LEGAL RESEARCH] 197 (2014).
21. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 44-47 (Julian Rivers trans.,
2002) (1986).
22. Id. at 47-48.
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not.” 23 For Alexy, rules have a “definitive character.” 24 Alexy
equates principles with standards that are part of an ideal
normative dimension, placing the reader on a deontological
sphere. From now on, the Author focuses on the collision of
principles.
The set of principles, rules (and also political guidelines) that
ground the Constitution do not always converge. Hence, the best
way to resolve a situation of conflict of interests, that is, when the
application of both principles seems to be adequate to solve the
problem, is to weigh those conflicting principles. By following this
path, the judge will try not to upset, or to upset as little as possible,
the interests protected by the colliding principles. 25 The Author
focuses on the collision between the constitutional principles of
equality26 and legality.27
23. Id. at 48.
24. Id. at 57.
25. See, e.g., the case repeatedly cited by Alexy where the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany had to decide if the satirical magazine “Titanic” should be ordered to pay
compensation in the amount of 12,000 Marcos for having used the term “né Murderer”
(“geborene morder”) in one of its editions, and having used the term “cripple” (“Krüppel”)
in a later edition to address a reserve officer who was paraplegic and had succeeded to be
called to perform a military duty. In this case, the court had to ponder and weigh two
fundamental rights—the right to freedom of expression and the right one has to their
honor. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 403-04.
26. Article 13 of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth the following:
1. All citizens possess the same social dignity and are equal before the law. 2. No
one can be privileged, favored, prejudiced, prevented from exercising a right or
exempted from any duty for reasons of their ancestry, sex, race, language,
territory of origin, religion, ideological, or political convictions, education,
economic situation, social condition or sexual orientation.
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 13.
In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
embodies the principle of equality through the equal protection clause that sets forth that
no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In the doctrine, for a definition of the principle of equality in the
context of Canada’s multiculturalism that comprises different ethnic minorities and
linguistic heterogeneity, see Terrence Meyerhoff, Multiculturalism and Language Rights in
Canada: Problems and Prospects for Equality and Unity, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 913, 963
(1994) (defining the principle of equality as “equality of opportunity for individuals and
equality in the treatment of, or respect for, groups.” Meyerhoff maintains that the principle
of equality is composed of two elements – one is “freedom from discrimination against
individuals; the other … focuses on group survival in the form of assistance for the
preservation of cultural and linguistic distinctiveness”).
27. The principle of legality or the rule of law is crucial in administrative law to
ensure fairness and consistency of the decisions of administrative agencies or authorities.
See Sydney A. Shapiro, The Top Ten Reasons that Law Students Dislike Administrative Law
and What Can (or Should) be Done about Them?, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 351, 352 (2000)
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The interpreter achieves the weighing or optimization of the
principles through the implementation of the principle of
proportionality. 28 This principle includes the sub-principles of
suitability, necessity, and proportionality in its narrow sense. For
Alexy, “fundamental rights” are principles. Like Alexy, the Author
will dwell on the concept of principle rather than the concept of
“fundamental right.”29 For Alexy, the core of the balancing process
lies in the “Law of Balancing.”30 The Law of Balancing reflects the
principle of proportionality in its narrow sense and can be
formulated as follows: “The greater the degree of non-satisfaction
of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the
importance of satisfying the other.”31
The Law of Balancing determines that the interpreter divide
the balancing process into three stages. The first stage corresponds
to the definition of the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment
to a first principle. In the second stage, the interpreter defines the
importance of satisfying the conflicting principle. In the third stage,
the interpreter must determine whether the importance of
satisfying the conflicting principle justifies the detriment to, or

(maintaining that administrative law is composed of three processes, the study of which is
highly challenging. He says that “[t]here is the: empowerment process, or the process by
which the agency receives its authority to make decisions and enforce them; internal
decision-making process, or the process by which the agency makes its decisions; and
external control process, or the process by which agencies are made accountable through
judicial review and through review by elected officials”. In all of these processes, statutory
law more than case law embodies the principle of legality).
28. The principle of proportionality is set forth by the Portuguese Constitution in
Article 18(2). CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE
REPUBLIC] art. 18(2). This article maintains that the law may only restrict rights, freedoms,
and guarantees in the cases expressly provided for in the Constitution. Those restrictions
must be strictly necessary to safeguard other constitutionally protected rights or
principles. Id. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences under Federal and
State Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 48 (2008) (saying that when courts seek to
enforce constitutional proportionality limits on sentencing (or on other government
measures), they should only intervene if the burdens on the defendant are clearly
excessive relative to the benefits, or if alternative sanctions or other measures are clearly
less burdensome and equally effective). For a critique of the principle of proportionality,
see Francisco J. Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality, 57 AM. J. JURIS. 49 (2012).
29 . Robert Alexy, Sobre los Derechos Constitucionales a Protección [Regarding
Constitutional Rights to Protection], in ROBERT ALEXY: DERECHOS SOCIALES Y PONDERACIÓN
[ROBERT ALEXY: SOCIAL RIGHTS AND BALANCING] 56-57 (Ricardo García Manrique ed., 2007).
30. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 50-56, 66-69, 102.
31. Id. at 102.
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non-satisfaction of, the first principle. 32 To ascertain the specific
weight of each of the principles, that is, the principle of equality and
the principle of legality, and which of them is of comparatively
greater importance, the Author breaks the Law of Balancing down
into its essential elements and applies the “Weight Formula” to the
case.
The degree of non-satisfaction or restriction of one principle
and the degree or importance of satisfaction of the other can be
assessed through a Triadic Scale or a model of three intensities—
light, moderate, or serious (l, m, or s).33
The first object of valuation as l, m, or s is the intensity of
interference (I) with a principle (Pi) in a given case (C). Alexy
assigns the meaning IPiC or Ii to the principle whose restriction or
infringement is analyzed. The interference with a principle is
concrete. Therefore, the intensity of interference or nonsatisfaction of that principle has an equally concrete magnitude.
Nevertheless, to stress the precise magnitude of interference, the
letter (C) is associated to the meaning provided above referring to
the circumstances of the case that are relevant to the decision.34
The second object of valuation as l, m, or s is the importance
of satisfaction (S) of the conflicting principle (Pj). The importance
of satisfaction of the conflicting principle also refers to the concrete
importance or actual weight of that principle. In line with what the
Author said on the intensity of interference with Pi, the same can
now be said of Pj. The concept of concrete importance or weight is
similar to the concept of the intensity of interference with Pi,
32. Id. at 105 (“stating that […] the Law of Balancing is not valueless. It identifies what
is significant in balancing exercises, namely the degree or intensity of non-satisfaction of,
or detriment to, one principle versus the importance of satisfying the other”).
33. ALEXY, supra note 21, at 405. For a critique of these valuation measures, see José
Juan Moreso, Alexy y la Aritmética de la Ponderación [Alexy and the Arithmetic of Balancing],
in ROBERT ALEXY: DERECHOS SOCIALES Y PONDERACIÓN [ROBERT ALEXY: SOCIAL RIGHTS AND
BALANCING] 232-33 (Ricardo García Manrique ed., 2007).
34. ALEXY, supra note 21, at 405-06. The balancing or weighing of principles Alexy
engages in reflects his definition of principles as optimization requirements. He weighs
principles involved in a case. Therefore, balancing which aims to help the interpreter find
the most correct answer, does not rely solely on a deductive scheme by which the
interpreter infers the applicable rule. Balancing, which is tied to argumentation, is based
on the concrete or relative weight of the principles in a case. The circumstances of the
specific case that are essential for the legal decision refer to the administrative order of
expulsion from the country of the illegal immigrant who was a victim of a crime, and to the
consequences which the implementation or non-execution of such order will have on the
relevant principles under analysis.
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because it deals with the intensity of a possible interference or
restriction in the face of non-interference. Therefore, concerning
Pj, the interpreter can adopt the analogous formula SPjC.35
What is the degree of interference (I) with Pi and what is the
concrete importance of satisfaction (S) of Pj, to which the Law of
Balancing refers? In other words, what is the concrete degree of
interference with the principle of equality in relation to the
principle of legality? What is the effect that the non-satisfaction or
interference with the principle of equality produces in the
satisfaction or fulfillment of the principle of legality? What kind of
constraints does the Constitution impose on the principle of
equality when it provides that the principle of legality is a
cornerstone of the democratic State? Does satisfying the principle
of legality justify restricting or not satisfying the principle of
equality?
To respond to these questions, the interpreter must take the
following three steps: (a) evaluate IPiC as l, m or s; (b) evaluate SPjC
as l, m or s; and (c) relate the two previous valuations, by using
criteria of comparability and, therefore, of commensurability,
perceived from a common point of view. This common point of
view is yielded by the Constitution, insofar as it stands for the
shared feeling of the community. The judge in our case must
evaluate the principle of equality and the principle of legality by
resorting to classic criteria of constitutional interpretation.
Generally, constitutional interpretation does not differ from other
types of interpretation. However, constitutional rights norms have
an open texture that challenges the interpreter in their craft.
The comparability of the principles as outlined above is
carried out through a “Weight Formula”. This formula illustrates
the structure underlying the Triadic Scale with the help of
numbers. 36 This formula determines the concrete weight of a
principle. It reflects the idea that principles become stronger if the
intensity of their constraint increases. It expands the Law of
Balancing. It goes as follows:
WPi,j C = IPiC/SPjC37

35. Id. at 406.
36. Id. at 408.
37. Id.
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In our case, the interpreter measures the concrete weight (W) of
the principle of equality (Pi) by the effects the non-interference
with the principle of legality (Pj) has on the principle of equality.
Put differently, the higher the weight of the principle of legality in
a concrete case, the more restrictive the principle of equality will
be.38
The Weight Formula determines that the concrete weight of a
principle be obtained through the quotient of the intensity of
interference with this principle (Pi) and the concrete importance
of the competing principle, (Pj). The concrete weight of a principle
is, therefore, a relative weight, which is expressed by the formula
Pi,j. The concrete weight of Pi is the concrete weight of Pi relative
to Pj.39
Here, the Author shall refer to the Weight Formula to
determine the intensity of the restriction on the principle of
equality (Pi). By ascertaining the intensity of interference with the
principle of equality, the Author will be able to assess the actual
weight of the principle of equality and the importance of the
principle of legality (Pj).
The author allocates the values 20, 21, and 22 , that is, 1, 2, and
4 to the three values of the Triadic Scale (l, m, and s) and applies
such numbers to our case.40 This way, the Author can verify that
the order of expulsion of the foreign citizen interfered with the
principle of equality (Pi) on the basis of value 4 (s). On the contrary,
that order of expulsion interfered with the principle of legality (Pj)
on the basis of value 1 (l).41 Hence:
s, l = 4 / 1 = 4

However, let us consider the contrary situation—that is, the
interpreter restricts the principle of legality (Pj) based on value 4,
and restricts the principle of equality (Pi) based on value 1.
l, s = l / 4 = 1 / 4

38. Id. at 408-09.
39. Id. at 409.
40. Id. at 409-10.
41. ALEXY, supra note 21, at 410. Indeed, the basis of the restriction value of the
principle of legality should be null, since the decision of the Immigration and Border
Services, subsequently confirmed by the “courts a quo and ad quem”, merely applied the
law qua tale. Nevertheless, the Author lets the values presented in the formula to guide her
for she deems them sufficient to demonstrate what the Author intends.
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This scenario allows us to conclude that the principles (Pi)
acquire a higher concrete weight when the intensity of their
restriction increases on minor grounds.42 Inherent to this idea is
the impression that principles increase their resistance as the
intensity of the interference with them increases. Why? Because
the resistant core of fundamental rights with the structure of
principles manifests itself whenever it faces an interference. In this
context, the more the interpreter interferes with the core of the
right to equal treatment deriving from the principle of equality, the
higher is the resistance of the principle of equality to that
interference.43
In respect to the case under analysis, it is important to ask the
following. Is there a disproportionate interference with the
principle of equality considering the weight of the principle of
legality?44 What effect do the constitutional provisions that “[a]ll
citizens have the same social dignity and are equal before the
law”45 and “[f]oreigners and stateless persons who are or reside in
Portugal enjoy the rights and are subject to the duties of the
Portuguese citizens”46 have on the principle of legality?
In the case at hand, the restriction of the principle of equality
was disproportionate. The Weight Formula demonstrates that
disproportionality. The degree of protection the interpreter
afforded to the principle of legality was higher than the protection
42. Id.
43. Id. at 424 (stating that “[. . .] as interference with a constitutional right increases,
so also does [. . .] its substantive resistance”).
44. It should be noted that the concrete importance of Pj (the principle of legality) is
measured by the degree of the intensity of the interference with Pj as a result of the noninterference with Pi. In other words, the lower the interference with Pi, the higher the
interference with Pj. Take, for example, the conflict that frequently arises between the right
to honor and the right to freedom of expression. Although these are two fundamental
rights, Alexy treats fundamental rights as principles. Thus, the present considerations
apply both to fundamental rights and principles. If a judge considers that there is a reason
not to restrict the right to honor given the circumstances of the case, then the right to
freedom of expression will be restricted as a result of the non-restriction of the right to
honor. Thus, the importance of the principle of legality arises from the calculation of the
intensity of its restriction resulting from the non-restriction of the principle of equality.
45. Article 13 (1) of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth that “[a]ll citizens possess
the same social dignity and are equal before the law”. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 13(1).
46. Article 15 (1) of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth that “[f]oreigners and
stateless persons who find themselves or who reside in Portugal enjoy the same rights and
are subject to the same duties as Portuguese citizens.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 15(1).
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they gave to the principle of equality. The interpreter did not
interfere with the principle of legality by interfering with the
principle of equality. The intensity of the interpreter’s interference
with the principle of legality was lower for their interference with
the principle of equality was much higher.
The court restricted the principle of equality based on an idea
of protection of the public interest and the public order. The
Author does not believe that the reasons that led to the
interference with the principle of equality were stronger than the
reasons justifying the non-interference with the principle of
equality. The rights that foreign nationals have to have the same
rights Portuguese citizens enjoy extended to them because those
foreign nationals share the same social dignity and have the right
to not to be discriminated against the law justify the noninterference with the principle of equality. While reading this case,
the Author adopts a universalist perspective that bears its stand
from the idea that the interpreter should read legal and
constitutional provisions in line with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.47 This sort of interpretation pays tribute to the fact
that fundamental rights are not subject to political bargaining or
loose judgments. They must and can be exercised by any person
regardless of their citizenship or nationality. In this respect, it is
essential to analyze the European Convention on Human Rights,
which requires that Contracting Parties secure, recognize, and
observe the human rights and fundamental freedoms of every
person under their jurisdiction,48 and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.49 Article 1 of the Charter sets forth
that “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and
protected.”
However, Alexy’s assertiveness is infinite because he does not
consider the system of precedence between principles as stagnant.
Weighing allows the interpreter to move toward correctness and
obtain more truth, but not all the truth. This incompleteness is a
reality because the system of precedence between principles can
47 . See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
48. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
49. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000
O.J. (C364).
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subside. That system will subside insofar as those who intend to
undertake such a modification argue accordingly. (Again, we are in
the realm of the discursively possible). 50 Their discourse must
respect the limits of practical argumentation, legal argumentation,
and the model of rationality of the democratic rule of law.
B. Ronald Dworkin: Principles or a Question of Principle? The
Interpretative Model and the System of Monological Rationality Hercules, the Judge.
Alexy, like Dworkin, considers that the difference between
rules and principles is essentially conceptual or qualitative and not
one of degree or commensurability. 51 Hence, the Author has
chosen to compare Alexy and Dworkin. As she reads Dworkin’s
work, she realizes how Dworkin invokes profound moral
principles that underlie the idea of equality of all. He understands
the principle of equality as equal concern and respect. He almost
treats it as a self-evident truth, which is in line with his
understanding that there may be one single right answer to a hard
case. Equal concern and respect for your fellow citizen would be
the correct answer.
In a democracy, numbers count. However, in Dworkin’s view,
democracy represents more than the majority rule. 52 At a
conference at the University of Nebraska in 2008, Dworkin
lectured on democracy, religion, and relations between the United
States of America and Israel (referring to themes such as Zionism
and immigration). Therein, he reiterated an idea that has been
widely reproduced in his scholarship -- “democracy must be a
partnership that allows each citizen over whom the nation claims
dominion and from whom it extracts allegiance to see the
government as his government, and that […] is not possible unless
the government shows to each citizen equal concern and equal

50. ALEXY ARGUMENTATION, supra note 6, at 135-36.
51. See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 48 (saying that “ […] the distinction between rules
and principles is a qualitative one and not one of degree. Every norm is either a rule or a
principle”).
52. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 177 (1986) (stating that “[w]e might think
that majority rule is the fairest workable decision procedure in politics, but we know that
the majority will sometimes, perhaps often, make unjust decisions about the rights of
individuals”).
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respect.”53 Accordingly, the rights of those groups often referred to
as “minorities”—thus categorized by criteria such as race,
ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and religion—
must be indisputably protected.
This appeal to the protective role of the state derives from
Dworkin’s personification of the state and the community, which,
in his work are treated as moral agents, that like the partnership
or the corporation have a separate personality from their
members. The implication of this personification is the creation of
an associative obligation 54 between the members of that
community from which it derives a social responsibility of each
member to feel outraged whenever state officials do not treat
every single member of that community with the equal
consideration and respect they deserve. He maintains that:
Once we accept that our officials act in the name of a
community of which we are all members, bearing a
responsibility we therefore share, then this reinforces and
sustains the character of collective guilt, our sense that we
must feel shame as well as outrage when they act unjustly.55

In that talk he gave at the University of Nebraska in 2008,
Dworkin uttered that a Democracy must show equal concern and
equal respect for its citizens. However, he clarified that a
Democracy does not need to show equal concern for every person
who would like to be a citizen. No nation opens its doors to all those
who would like to come, he said. 56 Indeed, the government of a
State may not adopt an immigration policy nor have it as a priority.
However, the State cannot fail to act with respect for those upon
53. Democracy
and
Religion:
America
and
Israel,
MEDIAHUB,
https://mediahub.unl.edu/media/546 [https://perma.cc/YLZ2-R5UJ] (last visited Apr. 1,
2020) [hereinafter Democracy and Religion].
54. RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 52 at 196 (defining associative obligations as “[. . .]
the special responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in some biological or
social group, like the responsibilities of family or friends or neighbors.” These are
obligations that one does not necessarily deliberately choose to accept them. The duty to
honor our responsibilities under social practices that define groups and attach
responsibilities to membership depend on conditions of reciprocity. The members of the
group must regard those obligations as special and personal. The members must
understand their responsibilities as stemming from their concern for the well-being of
others in the group. That concern must be equally shown for all members of the group.
These associative communities are political communities. Id. at 198-202).
55. RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 175.
56. See Democracy and Religion, supra note 53.

2020]

BALANCING PRINCIPLES

1025

whom it exercises and claims to have dominion, even if to
maintain: “our law does not apply to you.” At the very least, the
State cannot do so in a way which shows complete disrespect for
the fundamental rights of those citizens.
The neuralgic point of Dworkin’s critique of the utilitarian
theses and positivist conceptions of authors such as Jeremy
Bentham, John Austin, and, in particular, Herbert L. Hart, lies in the
realization that respect for individual principles and rights, which
can be used as trumps against the state because they are prior to
the State, binds judicial decisions.57 He, therefore, adopts an antiArchimedean stand. He refutes the existence of a fixed point,
outside of common morality, through which it would be possible to
leverage a response to a question in the context of a normative
debate.
The theory of adjudication that Dworkin develops is based on
an interpretative model of adjudication. He bases his model on a
metaphor—Hercules, the judge.58 It is an ideal mythological figure,
endowed with superpowers because Hercules is part of the
historical reality of a community in which it shares the idea of
morality. Alone, Hercules evaluates the fundamental principles of
that community, within the scope of an adjudication process
created by himself.
The interpretation Hercules undertakes should conceive Law
as integrity. That is, the judge, when analyzing the applicable
norms, should try to understand what their best justification will
be from the point of view of political morality.59 By doing this, the
judge must undertake a constant dialogue with history. Like the
interpreter in the context of Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation
who aims to find the correct answer contextually, Dworkin’s
Hercules aims to find the principle that spells out the right thing to
57 . RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 233-39 (1977) (using the case of
reverse discrimination to criticize utilitarian arguments. Utilitarian arguments rely on
policies that are understood to make the community as a whole better off, even if they are
discriminatory. Pursuant to the author, “[i]f we want to defend individual rights in the
sense in which we claim them, then we must try to discover something beyond utility that
argues for these rights”). Id. at 271.
58. RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 239.
59. Id. at 225. (explaining that “[t]he adjudicative principle of integrity instructs
judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they
were all created by a single author – the community personified – expressing a coherent
conception of justice and fairness”).
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do. However, unlike the cases adjudicated by the interpreter in
Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation, for certain cases which
Hercules must adjudicate, there is one correct answer only, which
is not subject to commensurability.
The Author also sees Dworkin’s interpretive model of
adjudication in light of a set of other metaphors: law works itself
pure; there is a higher law, within and yet beyond positive law,
toward which positive law grows; law has its own ambitions.60 All of
these metaphors acknowledge that judicial decisions or legislative
acts change the law to a certain extent. Let us take as an example
the petition of the Brazilian citizen who claimed the annulment of
the order of expulsion from the Portuguese territory. If we link the
decision of the judge to order the expulsion of the Brazilian citizen
to those three metaphors, we can draw one of the following
conclusions.
The change of the Law is inherent to a decision in favor of the
annulment of the order to expel a foreign citizen whose physical
integrity was violated. The decision of the court to annul such
order of expulsion would produce a change in the law because the
right to reside illegally in the country is not explicit in the
Constitution. However, if the interpretative argument in favor of
the annulment of the order of expulsion is a good argument, then,
the Law itself advocated for that change. The Law fulfilled its own
ambitions. A change of Law through adjudication is not neutral, but
rather an improvement of the Law itself, in the sense that a pure or
fair law is a better law. The change of the Law is a clarification of
what the Law already is. If better interpretation of the Law results
in the adjudication of a constitutional right to a certain citizen,
denying that right is the same as denying the opportunity for the
improvement of the Law. It is also a denial of the Law itself.
In the case under scrutiny, there are several things at stake.
The right of a foreign citizen who illegally resides in the country,
but over whom the State exercises its jurisdiction, to be treated in
the same way as a national citizen would if they were a victim of a
crime is at stake. The right of that foreign citizen to be protected by
the relevant guarantees of the laws of the criminal procedure
without having to undergo a test of confirmation of her situation in
the country is at stake. The right of that foreign citizen to be
60. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA L. REV. 173, 173 (1985).
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protected by the relevant rules of criminal procedure that prevent
the judge from using inadmissible evidence is at stake.61 The right
of that foreign citizen to equal consideration and respect lies on the
political belief that no citizen should have those rights put at stake.
The idea of integrity derives from the political ideal that the
community we live in is a principled one.
When the moment to decide comes, Hercules should ponder
which of the principles that that political community embraces
they should apply to the case.62 Dworkin believes that when there
is a conflict of principles whereby political guidelines clash on the
one hand, and individual rights and guarantees collide on the
other, the moral perspective must prevail. 63 In this context, the
prevalence of the moral standpoint is a matter of principle.
C. Hermeneutics and the Process of Adjudication: Hercules and the
Perception of the Other
From the above, a piece of evidence stands out: in Dworkin’s
doctrine, hermeneutics assumes a fundamental role. There is
significant opposition between the current legal order and another
one, of an altruistic nature, of solidarity and openness to the

61. Article 32 (8) of the Portuguese Constitution maintains that [. . .] all evidence
obtained through torture, coercion, the offense to the physical or moral integrity of the
individual, improper intromission into the individual’s personal life, home,
correspondence or telecommunications is void. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA
[CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 32 (8). Article 126(1) of the Portuguese
Criminal Procedure Code substantiates the constitutional provision and sets forth a list of
inadmissible evidence. C.P.P. art. 126(1). The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States sets forth that “No person shall be [ . . . ] compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
62. Dworkin does not show how the court should act to ponder this. Nevertheless,
the judge must analyze each principle and ask what principles and political guidelines offer
a better justification of the Law. The judge must ask the following question: What
interpretation of the Law based on the wording of the relevant legal provisions best serves
those principles or political guidelines?
63. In our case, principles rather than political guidelines are at issue because the
judicial decision to expel the foreign citizen from the country was based on the application
of the terms of the law rather than the implementation of a political statement. In our case,
the point is to understand whether there is a reason for the prevalence of the principle of
legality over the principle of equality, from the moral standpoint. In the quest for the
solution to this conflict, the interpreter will ignore the political guidelines that might have
determined the enactment of the relevant legislation.
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Other. 64 In postmodern States, or states that are situated in a
“liquid modernity,” the need for openness to the Other is pressing.
Hermeneutics recognizes this need.65 Thus, in addition to being a
neo-constitutionalist, Hercules should be hermeneutic.
What does it mean to be a foreign citizen in the eyes of the
administrative authorities and in the eyes of a judge? A possible
answer can be found through the adoption of a discursiveinterpretative approach to understand the world that surrounds
us; through our historical context, and language to approach the
past. However, the discourse adopted must be pragmatic, open,
and capable of breaking with the traditions and preconceptions on
which we base our finitude, our indigence, our partiality, and our
previous involvement.
Essentially, defining the meaning of foreign citizen is the same
as questioning the prejudices that bind us as a condition of access
to knowledge. Providing such definition involves the immersion
into a profound process of psychoanalysis, the voluntary
submission to a Freudian treatment for the recovery of prejudice,
through dialogue, discourse, and presentation of arguments to
respond to the problems of the present. Looking for that meaning
is what the judge in our case should have done. They should have
questioned all existing preconceptions (including the legal ones)
and presented arguments that would show, in the context of an
action for an injunction, the judge’s necessary sensitivity to the
way the expulsion process had been triggered. The judge in our
case should have proceeded in this manner not because the
plaintiff-defendant was a Brazilian citizen, but because she was a
foreign citizen, who was denied protection under the principle of
equality. If no national citizen would have been denied that
protection under the same circumstances, then neither should that
foreign citizen face that denial.

64. ANTÓNIO MANUEL HESPANHA, O CALEIDOSCÓPIO DO DIREITO: O DIREITO E A JUSTIÇA NOS
DIAS E NO MUNDO DE HOJE [THE KALEIDOSCOPE OF LAW: LAW AND JUSTICE NOWADAYS IN THE
WORLD TODAY] 476 (2d ed. 2009).
65. Essentially, the Author refers to philosophical hermeneutics. On this matter and
for a preliminary approach, see Zygmunt Bauman, The Challenges of Hermeneutics, in THE
BAUMAN READER 125-138 (Peter Beilharz ed., 2001); Odo Marquard, The Question, To What
Question Is Hermeneutics the Answer?, in FAREWELL TO MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES 111 (Robert Wallace trans., 1989) (1981).
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IV. THE CREATION OF A GENERAL THEORY OF STATE AND LAW:
CONCLUSIONS
What is the value of fundamental rights and freedoms
assigned to national and foreign citizens in light of the rule of law
and the democratic state? Has the interpreter fulfilled the principle
of the rule of law and the democratic state through an inflexible
conception of the principle of legality? Are administrative
authorities justified to deprive citizens, regardless of their
nationality, of the constitutional protection afforded to their most
fundamental rights and freedoms? 66 How far can or should
administrative authorities go? How far can or should the judge go?
How far can or should the State go? What is the fate of the foreign
citizen?
Administrative authorities, while following criteria of
efficiency, competence, and promptness in their responses to the
claims of the citizens, must not fail to treat any individual as the
human being they are. Thus, the interpreter should be open to
reinterpreting the principle of legality and separation of powers. It
is vital that besides their executive power, administrative
authorities can fill in the gaps in the interstices of the law. It is
crucial that the public administrator, as well as the judge, can intuit
the correct answer (regarding the case at hand, the Author
assumes her skepticism) to the case. That level of intuition
requires the assumption of a more intense relationship with the
law and accepts that the interpreter cannot reduce Law to only one
positive set of rules; the Law also contains principles.
The interpreter must recognize that constitutionally
consecrated rights are influential beyond the State-citizen
relationship. The interpreter must recognize the “radiating effect”
these rights have on the overall legal system.67 No agnosticism is
justified here. Thus, what is essential for the resolution of our case
66. In the text, the Author is referring to fundamental rights and freedoms such as
the right to life, personal identity, citizenship, freedom of religion, etc.
67 . See ALEXY, supra note 21, at 352, citing the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany:
[A]ccording to the long-standing case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court,
constitutional rights norms do not simply contain defensive rights of the
individual against the state, but at the same time they embody an objective order
of values, which applies to all areas of law as a basic constitutional decision, and
which provides guidelines and impulses for the legislature, administration and
the judiciary.
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and other similar cases is to learn the way the judge should
interpret and apply the constitutional provisions to the case.
As part of public administration, the conduct of the members
of law enforcement was unacceptable from a constitutional point
of view. In addition to the principles of equality and justice, the
principle of impartiality 68 determines that their actions towards
citizens (whether they are foreigners or not) be exempt, objective,
neutral, and independent. The principles of equality, justice, and
impartiality also determine that citizens subject to administrative
proceedings be acknowledged the right to know why is it that, in
those circumstances, they cannot be treated in the same way any
national would have if that national had been a victim of a crime of
offense to their physical integrity. The need that citizen has to be
informed implies that administrative authorities provide public
criteria for assessing the context. In our case, members of law
enforcement should have felt compelled to explain the context that
prompted them to ask that Brazilian citizen for her passport as a
condition precedent to her filing of a criminal complaint, when
they knew that such request would probably render the relevant
criminal proceedings unenforceable.
The respect for the principles of equality and proportionality
determines that foreign citizens cannot be denied fundamental
rights to which national citizens also are entitled. If such denial
occurs, it must lie on rational arguments. The principle of equality
also encapsulates the right to judicial protection. Accordingly,
denial of justice to a foreign citizen through administrative
procedure restricts the principle of effective judicial protection.69
The principle of effective judicial protection yields the adoption of
precautionary measures that safeguard the effectiveness of the
action. The principle of effective judicial protection also prevents
fundamental rights or legally protected interests, which the
plaintiff-defendant meant to protect through the action she filed,
from getting seriously and irreparably injured.
68. Article 266 (2) of the Portuguese Constitution sets forth that administrative
agents are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law and must act with respect for the
principles of equality, proportionality, justice, impartiality, and good faith. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA
REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 266(2).
69. Article 20 of the Portuguese Constitution foresees the right to effective judicial
protection and Article 268(4) lists a number of rights and guarantees constitutionally
provided to citizens who deal with administrative authorities. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] arts. 20, 268(4).
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The correct resolution of the case that illustrates this text is a
matter of principles, for which denial the judge did not find good
reasoning. The interpreter can only give real existence to the rule
of law and the informing principles of the democratic state by
undertaking a correct interpretation of the law. They can achieve
that by following rules of procedure that control their legal
argumentation and by interpreting the law based on criteria of
integrity and in line with the applicable constitutional norms. The
constitutional interpretation that pays tribute to the ideals of
integrity, coherence, and correctness will allow the realization of
the rule of law and the democratic state. That interpretation will
allow the creation of a general theory of the State and Law. The
most fundamental constitutional principles will strengthen that
theory to its core.
In the words of Habermas:
If one shares Dworkin’s deontological understanding of law and
follows the argumentation-theoretic considerations advanced by
such authors as Aarnio, Alexy, and Günter, one will agree with two
theses. First, legal discourse cannot operate self-sufficiently inside
a hermetically sealed universe of existing norms but must rather
remain open to arguments from other sources. In particular, it
must remain open to the pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasons
brought to bear in the legislative process and bundled together in
the legitimacy claim of legal norms. Second, the rightness of legal
decisions is ultimately measured by how well the decision process
satisfies the communicative conditions of argumentation that
make impartial judgment possible.70

70. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, supra note 7, at 230.
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